A General Framework for Fairness in Multistakeholder Recommendations by Chaudhari, Harshal A. et al.
A General Framework for Fairness in Multistakeholder
Recommendations
Harshal A. Chaudhari∗
Boston University
Boston, MA
harshal@cs.bu.edu
Sangdi Lin
Zillow Group
Seattle, WA
sangdil@zillowgroup.com
Ondrej Linda
Zillow Group
Seattle, WA
ondrejl@zillowgroup.com
ABSTRACT
Contemporary recommender systems act as intermediaries on
multi-sided platforms serving high utility recommendations from
sellers to buyers. Such systems attempt to balance the objectives of
multiple stakeholders including sellers, buyers, and the platform
itself. The difficulty in providing recommendations that maximize
the utility for a buyer, while simultaneously representing all the
sellers on the platform has lead to many interesting research prob-
lems. Traditionally, they have been formulated as integer linear
programs which compute recommendations for all the buyers to-
gether in an offline fashion, by incorporating coverage constraints
so that the individual sellers are proportionally represented across
all the recommended items. Such approaches can lead to unfore-
seen biases wherein certain buyers consistently receive low utility
recommendations in order to meet the global seller coverage con-
straints. To remedy this situation, we propose a general formulation
that incorporates seller coverage objectives alongside individual
buyer objectives in a real-time personalized recommender system.
In addition, we leverage highly scalable submodular optimization al-
gorithms to provide recommendations to each buyer with provable
theoretical quality bounds. Furthermore, we empirically evaluate
the efficacy of our approach using data from an online real-estate
marketplace.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The rise of e-commerce platforms in the past decade have made
recommender systems ubiquitous over the world wide web. Recom-
mender systems typically assist the buyers on a web marketplace
by recommending them items that are closely aligned to their pref-
erences, thereby significantly reducing the time required for search.
They have been successfully used in several different domains viz.,
e-commerce platforms such as Amazon, eBay, etc., media streaming
platforms like Netflix, Spotify, etc., social networks like Facebook,
Twitter, etc., as well as the hospitality services like Yelp, Airbnb,
etc.
Traditionally, such systems have always aimed at maximizing
the utility of recommendations by tailoring them towards the pref-
erences of an individual target buyer. Such recommendations are
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referred to as personalized recommendations. Increasingly, the ad-
vent of multi-sidedmarketplaces such as Airbnb, UberEats, etc. have
shone spotlight on the issue of welfare of other stakeholders, who
are also affected by these buyer-oriented recommender systems.
Multi-sided marketplaces, which primarily rely on network effects
for growth are therefore increasingly motivated to include their
objectives in addition to buyers. Providing meaningful exposure
to new sellers or niche brands that are attractive to small market
segments, supporting small businesses as they compete with the
conglomerates for buyer attention, etc. are a few objectives impor-
tant to the other stakeholders of the platforms. Without explicitly
accounting for such goals, the recommender systems can cause un-
desirable biases, filter bubbles, and contribute to the ‘rich become
richer’ phenomenon on their platforms.
In this work, we propose a scalable multi-stakeholder recom-
mender system capable of optimizing for multiple criteria across
different stakeholders. Specifically, we consider individual sellers
on the platform as different stakeholders, who would like their
items to be proportionally represented in the recommendations.
This problem has traditionally been formulated as an integer linear
program [12, 17]. However, the heuristic algorithms used to solve
such integer programs cannot provide guarantees on the quality of
solution when compared to the optimal solution. In contrast, we
formulate the task as a multi-objective optimization problem con-
sisting of submodular stakeholder coverage objective augmented
with linear (modular) auxiliary objective. This task is solvable in
a computationally efficient manner while also providing provable
guarantees on the quality of the solution. The main contributions
of our work are:
• Formulation of fair multi-stakeholder recommendations as a
submodular maximization problem, capable of incorporating
multiple auxiliary objectives simultaneously, while providing
strong approximation guarantees on the quality of solution.
• Empirical evaluation using data from Zillow, a real estate mar-
ketplace.
2 BACKGROUND
In addition to extensive literature on personalized recommenda-
tions, multi-receiver/multi-provider recommendations, etc., in re-
cent years, there is a growing interest in analyzing recommendation
systems under the lens of fairness. In this section, we position our
work in the context of broad recommender systems and related
optimization techniques.
2.1 Multistakeholder Systems
Multistakeholder recommender systems are a broad category of
recommender systems that involve more than one stakeholders.
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In their simplest form, the reciprocal recommendation systems
including ‘person-to-person’ links on social networks [7], online
dating [18] and job search platforms [13] are all examples of sys-
tems with two stakeholders. We focus on large scale multi-sided
platforms such as Amazon, Alibaba, Airbnb, etc., connecting sellers
to buyers. Ideally, the percentage of items belonging to each seller
in the items recommended to a buyer should be proportional to the
number of items belonging to the particular stakeholder that are
relevant to the buyer.
Solutions to the above challenges using multi-objective optimiza-
tion are explored in the works such as [1, 3]. The importance of
price and profit awareness in the recommender systems is studied
by [9] and [15]. Works like [11, 14, 19] contribute to the very im-
portant domain of analyzing the fairness of recommender systems.
Ekstrand and Kluver [4] explore the gender-discriminatory effects
of collaborative filtering in book ratings and recommendations.
Works like [16] and [10] explore the impact of sensitive variables
on the fairness of recommendations systems. Perhaps closest to
our objective, the recent work of Sürer et al. [17] imposes fair-
ness constraints in terms of minimum coverage of different sellers
across recommendations to all the buyers using sub-gradient based
methods to reformulate the coverage optimizing integer program.
In contrast, our formulation does not impose strict coverage con-
straints. Intuitively, in situations where adhering to strict coverage
constraints results in dramatic sacrifice of utility of recommenda-
tions, our formulation automatically relaxes such constraints while
still satisfying strong approximation bounds in regards to quality
of solution. Moreover, our formulation determines recommenda-
tions per buyer and can be incorporated into any personalized
recommendation system in form a post-processing step.
2.2 Optimization Techniques
This section reviews some of the recent advances in the field of
submodulaar optimization that our method heavily relies on. Filmus
and Ward [6] provided one of the earliest methods to maximize a
monotone submodular function under matroid constraints. Leverag-
ing multi-linear relaxations of submodular functions, Feldman [5]
proposed a continuous greedy algorithm that approximately max-
imizes an objective comprised of a submodular function and an
arbitrary linear function. Recently, scalable greedy algorithms with
similar approximation bounds, to maximize difference between a
submodular function and a non-negative modular function are de-
scribed in [8]. There have been further advances in the field that
provide computationally faster algorithms with slightly worse ap-
proximation bounds [2]. While not an exhaustive list of literature
in the domain of submodular maximization, the scalability and
generalizability of our proposed formulation is made possible by
the exemplary contributions of the works mentioned above.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION FOR
MULTI-STAKEHOLDER FAIRNESS
We focus on a multi-stakeholder system where an e-commerce plat-
form provides recommendations of items from sellers to the buyers
browsing on the platform. When a buyer submits a search query on
such a platform, the recommender system suggests relevant items.
Without loss of generalizability, we consider each seller on the
platform as a stakeholder, and use the two terms interchangeably
henceforth. In the application discussed in Section 5, we extend the
definition of stakeholders to include different sources of property
listings on Zillow, an online real-estate marketplace. As described
in the previous section, the primary objective of our recommender
system is to ensure that the percentage of items belonging to each
stakeholder in the items recommended to a buyer is proportional
to the number of items belonging to the particular stakeholder that
are relevant to the buyer. Henceforth, we refer to this objective as
the coverage objective. In addition to the coverage objective, a plat-
form can have secondary objectives such as minimizing logistical
costs, maximizing utility of recommendations, etc., referred to as
auxiliary objectives. We aim to optimize the recommender system
such that it achieves an optimal trade-off between both of these
objectives.
Next, we formally define our problem setup. Let B = {1, · · · ,m}
be the set of buyers andU = {1, · · · ,n} be the set of items. It should
be noted that only a subset of items Ub ∈ U from the universe of
candidate items are relevant to each buyer b. We represent stake-
holders as a set of sellers S = {1, · · · , t}. For each item u ∈ U , let
S(u) ⊆ S denote the sellers who store item u in their inventory.
Similarly, let U (s) ⊆ U be the set of items in the inventory of a
seller s ∈ S . The goal of our recommendation system is to suggest
k items to the buyer that fairly cover all the sellers, assuming that
k ≤ n. When serving recommendations, we use a binary variable
xu,s to denote whether an itemu is recommended to a buyer covers
a seller s i.e., xu,s = 1 iff u ∈ U (s).
3.1 Stakeholder Coverage:
To define the stakeholder coverage objective, we first formalize the
notion of fair coverage.
3.1.1 Fair coverage: A set of k recommendations denoted by Rb
given to a buyer b is considered fair to all stakeholders if and only
if
∀s ∈ S :
∑
u ∈Rb xu,s
k
≥ |Ub (s)||Ub |
. (1)
Equation 1 ensures that the percentage of each seller’s inventory
included in the recommended items Rb is at least as high as the
percentage of the seller’s inventory relevant to the buyer b. Hence-
forth, we refer to the ratio |Ub (s) ||Ub | as the fair coverage threshold of
seller s for buyer b and denote it by δs,b . It should be noted that
Sürer et al. [17] imposes similar provider constraint across all the
buyers and sellers together:
∀s ∈ S :
∑
b ∈B
(∑
u ∈Rb xu,s
m × k
)
≥ |U (s)|
n
(2)
Our definition of fair coverage supersedes such a constraint be-
cause ensuring fair coverage for each seller in recommendations
for every buyer query obviously leads to satisfying the provider
constraint in Equation 2 across all buyers and sellers, but not vice
versa. Furthermore, just satisfying provider constraints can lead to
biased situations where individual buyers are consistently provided
low utility recommendations in order to satisfy a global coverage
constraint for a seller. Defining fair coverage on individual buyer
makes it possible to augment output of any modern personalized
recommendation system with our objective in real-time.
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3.1.2 Coverage objective: Having defined fair coverage, we are now
in a position to formalize the coverage objective denoted by F (.).
For a set of recommendations Rb , the value of coverage objective
is:
F (Rb ) :=
∑
s ∈S
min
(∑
u ∈Rb xu,s
k
,δs,b
)
(3)
Let us remind ourselves about the submodular functions. A set
function f : 2V → R is submodular if for every A ⊆ B ⊆ V and
e ∈ V \ B it holds that f (A ∪ {e}) − f (A) ≥ f (B ∪ {e} − f (B).
Lemma 3.1. The coverage objective F (.) is a submodular set func-
tion.
Proof. For a buyer b, consider two sets of items R0,R1 ⊆ Ub
such that R0 ⊂ R1. Consider an item u0 ∈ Ub \ R1. Without loss
of generality, we assume that S = {s0} i.e., there is a single stake-
holder to be covered and u0 ∈ U (s0). This gives rise to two cases
enumerated below.
Case 1: The set R0 provides fair coverage to stakeholder s0. Hence,∑
u∈R0 xu0,s0
k ≥ δs0,b . Hence, F (R0) = δs0,b . Given that R0 ⊂ R1,
we also know that F (R1) = δs0,b . Moreover, F (R0 ∪ {u0}) = δs0,b
and F (R1 ∪ {u0}) = δs0,b . Hence, F (R0 ∪ {u0}) − F (R0) = F (R1 ∪
{u0}) − F (R1) = 0.
Case 2: The set R0 does not cover the stakeholder s0 fairly. Hence,∑
u∈R0 xu0,s0
k < δs0,b . Hence, F (R0 ∪ {u0}) − F (R0) = 1/k . If the rec-
ommendations R1 fairly covers the stakeholder s0, F (R1 ∪ {u0}) −
F (R1) = 0, else, F (R1 ∪ {u0}) − F (R1) = 1/k .
Thus, in both cases, F (R0 ∪ {u0}) − F (R0) ≥ F (R1 ∪ {u0}) − F (R1).
Hence, proved.
3.2 Auxiliary objectives:
Let us denote an auxiliary objective by G(.). We differentiate the
potential auxiliary objectives into two broad categories viz., maxi-
mization objectives and the minimization objectives.
3.2.1 Maximization Objectives. Such an auxiliary objective typi-
cally involves maximizing an attribute related to the recommended
item alongside the primary objective of fair multi-stakeholder cov-
erage. For example, maximization of the utility of recommendations.
All modern personalized recommender systems typically compute a
utility score ru,b denoting the relevance of itemu to a buyer b using
various models such as collaborative filtering or a content-based
recommendation system. Thus, total utility of recommended items
is:
G(Rb ) :=
∑
u ∈Rb
ru,b (4)
As the utility scores are non-negative and computed beforehand
and generally fixed for each item, we can assume thatG(.) is a mod-
ular set function (equality in the submodular function definition).
Note that the objectives like maximization of non-negative fixed
attributes such as profit margins, etc. can be incorporated similarly.
3.2.2 Minimization Objectives. Next, we consider the scenario re-
quiring minimizing an attribute related to the recommended items
while simultaneously attempting to maximize the fair coverage
objective. For example, one can envision a user-oriented goal that
recommends items to a buyer that have minimum cost per unit
utility. In contrast to the utility maximization objective above, we
would like to minimize the cost per unit utility of recommendations.
Hence,
G(Rb ) :=
∑
u ∈Rb
cu/ru,b (5)
where cu is the cost of an item.
3.3 Overall Objective:
Combining the stakeholder fair coverage objective with the auxil-
iary objectives above, we obtain the overall objective in the form
Fα (Rb ) := αF (Rb ) ± (1 − α)G(Rb ) (6)
where α ∈ [0, 1] allows us to control the trade-off between the
two objectives. Note that we add the two objectives when dealing
with a maximization auxiliary objective, and take the difference in
case of a minimization auxiliary objective. A reader may correctly
wonder the need for differentiation between the maximization and
minimization auxiliary objectives, since typically the two are inter-
changeable with a change of sign. However, in our case, as described
in the subsequent sections, the nature of auxiliary objectives af-
fects the properties of the overall combined objective Fα (.), and
subsequently the optimization algorithms. Hence, we differentiate
between the two.
Problem 1. Given a set of buyers B, a set of items U , a set of
stakeholders S and platform parameter α , recommend a set of items
R∗b to each buyer such that:
R∗b = argmaxRb ⊆Ub
Fα (Rb )
s.t., |Rb | = k . (7)
In the following section, we show how existing contributions from
the field of submodular optimization can be used to optimize the
combined objective with strong approximation guarantees.
4 ALGORITHMS
In this section, we describe the two principal algorithms that we
use to optimize the overall objective formulated above.
4.1 Maximization Auxiliary Objectives
First, we account for the case where the auxiliary objective is maxi-
mization of a non-negative modular set function, described in sec-
tion 3.2.1. It can be trivially shown that the corresponding overall
objective function obtained in this situation is a monotone submod-
ular function. Such a function can be maximized using a simple
greedy approach in Algorithm 1 that builds the recommended items
set iteratively. Let us denote the marginal gain of adding a new item
to a set of recommendations by Fα (u |Rb ) = Fα (Rb∪{u})−Fα (Rb ).
In each iteration, the greedy Algorithm 1 simply adds to the set
the item with the largest marginal gain. Moreover, the solution
provided by the greedy algorithm satisfies strong approximation
guarantee.
Fα (Rb ) ≥ (1 −
1
e
)Fα (R∗b )
whereR∗b is the optimal solution for the Problem 1 with a maximiza-
tion auxiliary objective. Notably, for each buyer b, the algorithm
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ALGORITHM 1: Greedy
1 Input: Set of relevant items for buyerUb , fair coverage
thresholds δs,b for each seller, k,α ;
2 Output: Set of recommended items Rb ;
3 Rb = ∅;
4 while |Rb | ≤ k
5 z = argmaxu ∈Ub Fα (u |Rb );
6 Rb ← Rb ∪ {z};
7 Ub ← Ub \ {z};
8 return Rb
iterates through all candidate items on line 5 to find the item with
the largest marginal gain, resulting in a time complexity of O(nk)
per buyer, not accounting for the complexity of evaluating the
coverage objective itself.
In online personalized recommender systems with thousands of
potential items, such an approach can potentially increase response
times, when set of recommendations are updated continuously
based on user activity within a session. For such applications, we
may achieve a significant speed-up without a loss of quality of
the solution by using a priority heap to avoid re-computation of
marginal gain of all items, as shown in Algorithm 2.
On account of submodularity, the marginal gain of elements can
only decrease in each iteration. Leveraging this observation, we
only need to re-evaluate the marginal gains of a small subset of
items per iteration, until the item whose marginal gain computed
in the previous iteration is less than the updated marginal gain of
the top-most element in the priority heap as shown on line 8 of
Algorithm 2. It should be noted that the worst case complexity of
Algorithm 2 is the same as that of Algorithm 1. But in most practical
applications, it is significantly faster.
4.2 Minimization Auxiliary Objectives
Next, we describe the algorithm for the situationwhere the auxiliary
objective is a minimization of a non-negative modular set function,
described in Section 3.2.2. The main challenge in such cases is
that the function αF (Rb ) − (1 − α)G(Rb ) can be either positive
or negative, making the overall objective function non-monotone.
However, very recent work of Harshaw et al. [8] provides us with
theoretically guaranteed fast algorithms for such an objective. The
reason a standard greedy algorithm fails to optimize such an ob-
jective is described below. Suppose there is a ‘bad item’ u which
has highest overall marginal gain Fα (u |∅) and so is added to the
recommended items set; however, once added, the marginal gain
of all remaining items drops below their corresponding auxiliary
objective value, and so the greedy algorithm terminates. This is
sub-optimal when there are other elements v that, although their
overall marginal gain Fα (v |Rb ) is lower, have much higher ratio
between the coverage objective and the auxiliary objective.
To resolve this issue, Harshaw et al. use a distorted greedy cri-
terion as shown in line 5 of Algorithm 3 which gradually places
higher relative weight on the stakeholder coverage objective when
compared to the auxiliary objective as the algorithm progresses.
However, it should be noted that since the overall objective can
ALGORITHM 2: Lazy Greedy
1 Input: Set of relevant items for buyerUb , fair coverage
thresholds δs,b for each seller, k,α ;
2 Output: Set of recommended items Rb ;
3 Rb = ∅;
4 Create maximum priority heap H and push each key u from
Ub with value vu = Fα (u |∅);
5 while |Rb | ≤ k
6 Pull top key i from the priority heap H ;
7 Evaluate new marginal gain Fα (i |Rb ), Φ = {i};
8 while True
9 Pull top key j from the priority heap with value vj ;
10 if Fα (i |Rb ) ≥ vj
11 break;
12 else
13 Φ← Φ ∪ {j};
14 z = argmaxi ∈Φ Fα (i |Rb );
15 Rb ← Rb ∪ {z};
16 Φ← Φ \ {i};
17 for each j ∈ Φ
18 Re-insert key j into the heap H with value
vj = Fα (j |Rb );
19 return Rb
be negative, we only recommend items with a positive distorted
gain as shown in line 6 of the algorithm. Hence, for certain values
of α , we may encounter a situation where the recommendations
provided by the algorithm are less than k . Using Theorem 3 of
Harshaw et al. [8], it can be shown that Algorithm 3 provides a
solution Rb for each buyer such that,
Fα (Rb ) ≥ (1 −
1
e
)αF (R∗b ) − (1 − α)G(R∗b ). (8)
Intuitively, this guarantee states that the value of overall objective is
at least as much as would be obtained by recommending items of the
same cost as the optimal solution, while gaining at least a fraction
(1−1/e) of its stakeholder coverage. Furthermore, Algorithm 3 time
complexity can be improved by sampling the items from which the
best item is chosen in each iteration (line 5). Theorem 4 of Harshaw
et al. [8] shows that, if we sample uniformly and independently⌈ |Rb |
k log
( 1
ϵ
)⌉
items from Ub in each iteration to maximize over,
we can reduce the time complexity to O(n log(1/ϵ)) where ϵ is an
error parameter, while achieving the same performance guarantee
in expectation.
E[Fα (Rb )] ≥ (1 −
1
e
)αF (R∗b ) − (1 − α)G(R∗b ). (9)
The sampling version of Algorithm 3 is referred to as ‘Stochastic
Distorted Greedy’.
4.3 Multiple auxiliary objectives
One may envisage an application where there are multiple auxil-
iary objectives. Algorithm 2 can optimize multiple maximization
objectives together. On the other hand, Algorithm 3 can optimize
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ALGORITHM 3: Distorted Greedy (Harshaw et al. [8])
1 Input: Set of relevant items for buyerUb , fair coverage
thresholds δs,b for each seller, k,α ;
2 Output: Set of recommended items Rb ;
3 Rb = ∅;
4 for i = 0 to k − 1
5 z = argmaxu ∈Ub
{(
1− 1k
)k−(i+1)
αF (u |Rb ) − (1−α)G(u)
}
;
6 if
{(
1 − 1k
)k−(i+1)
αF (u |Rb ) − (1 − α)G(u)
}
> 0
7 Rb ← Rb ∪ {z};
8 Ub ← Ub \ {z};
9 return Rb
multiple minimization objectives simultaneously. Combination of
different maximization and minimization objectives together poses
an interesting dilemma. For example, consider an auxiliary objective
of the form:
G(Rb ) = β0
∑
u ∈Rb
ru,b + β1
∑
u ∈Rb
(−cu ) + β2 · · ·
where βi ∈ [0, 1] controls the relative importance of the auxiliary
objectives. In applications where the individual auxiliary objectives
are fixed (i.e. known in advance), the operator can verify in ahead
of time ifG(Rb ) is non-negative and use the appropriate algorithm.
An interesting situation arises if the auxiliary objective value for
each item is not fixed. For the purpose of brevity, we do not discuss
such a situation in this work. However, an enterprising reader may
refer to the Continuous Greedy algorithm proposed by Feldman [5].
It maximizes the multi-linear extension of the coverage objective
alongside an arbitrary linear auxiliary objective, and follows it with
Pipage rounding procedure to obtain a discrete solution with strong
approximation guarantees, as described in Feldman [5].
5 DATA AND EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we begin by describing the data obtained from
Zillow, an online real estate marketplace, and then we evaluate the
performance of our proposed approach.
5.1 Data Description
Real estate buyers visiting the Zillow website are typically shown
a paginated list of recommended property listings satisfying the
various filter criteria within the searched region. Zillow uses its
proprietary algorithms to personalize recommendations to potential
buyers based on their search criteria. The top listings recommended
to the potential buyers are typically obtained from various sources.
Majority of the properties on the platform are listed by independent
third-party realtors, alongside ‘New construction homes’ listed by
builders, as well as Zillow owned homes. Furthermore, some of
these listings have various attributes such as availability of 3D or
video tours available to the potential buyers. It is in this context that
Zillow is faced with the multi-stakeholder recommender system.
In this application, we consider a random sample of over 13,000
search sessions obtained from buyer interactions on the website.
After applying the filters set by the buyers during these search ses-
sions we end up with a collection of over 36,000 potential candidate
listings. In this setting, we consider 5 different stakeholders viz.,
independent listings, new constructions, Zillow owned, 3D homes and
video tours. It should be noted that a single listing can potentially
belong to multiple stakeholders. For example, a new construction
home listing may sometimes have an accompanying 3D home tour.
Each listing has a fixed dollar cost and an associated buyer specific
utility score. As a platform operator, our objective is to recommend
each buyer 20 listings that cover the relevant stakeholders fairly as
defined in Section 3.1.1.
5.1.1 Experimental Settings: For all the experiments, we run a mul-
tiprocessing Python implementation of the algorithms where each
process independently recommends items for an individual buyer.
All the results presented below reflect the evaluation of the objec-
tives based on a uniform random sample of 1000 sessions and their
associated listings. Although our application has a limited number
of stakeholders, as the computation of the coverage objective is
linear in the number of stakeholders, our approach does not face
scalability issues in situations with a large number of stakeholders.
Furthermore, we do not require any extra storage for Algorithm 1
and Algorithm 3. In case of Algorithm 2, the extra storage required
for the maximum priority heap is O(n).
5.2 Experimental Results
We empirically evaluate the proposed formulation and algorithms
for fair multi-stakeholder coverage alongside two separate auxiliary
objectives viz., utility maximization using Algorithm 2 and dollar
cost per unit utility minimization using Algorithm 3.
5.2.1 Stakeholder coverage: In this experiment, we measure the
difference between the stakeholder coverage achieved by our ap-
proach and the desired target coverage required by the fair coverage
criterion. Specifically, if we represent the proportion of recom-
mended listings belonging to stakeholder s by ηs,b and the fair
coverage threshold for the same stakeholder by δs,b as described in
Section 3.1.1, then we plot the difference ∆s,b = ⌈k(ηs,b − δs,b )⌉
averaged over all the buyers, for varying values of the parameter
α . When ∆s,b ≥ 0 for all stakeholders, we conclude that fair cover-
age is achieved. On the other hand, ∆s,b < 0 implies that at least
one stakeholder s is under represented in the k recommendations.
In Figure 1, we observe that a fair coverage of all stakeholder is
achieved for both the auxiliary objectives, as the value of α i.e.,
importance of coverage objective increases.
5.2.2 Performance trade-offs: Here, we visualize the trade-off be-
tween the primary fair coverage objective and the auxiliary objec-
tive during utility maximization and cost minimization in Figure 2.
For clarity of visualization, we scale the auxiliary objective dur-
ing cost per unit utility minimization by multiplying it with 10−6.
We clearly see the trade-off between the coverage objective and
the utility of recommendations in Figure 2a. When α = 0, only
the highest utility listings are recommended. As the value of α
increases, the overall utility of recommended listings is slightly
sacrificed in order to improve the stakeholder coverage. During the
cost per unit utility minimization in Figure 2b, the increase in cost
of recommendations in order to improve the stakeholder coverage
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Figure 1: Fair coverage of stakeholders
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Figure 2: Trade-offs between coverage and auxiliary objec-
tives
is not very apparent in this data due to the use of Stochastic Greedy
algorithm with error parameter ϵ = 0.1.
5.2.3 Runtime comparisons: Lastly, we compare the algorithm run-
times per buyer for different objectives in Figure 3. While the worst
case time complexity for Lazy Greedy algorithm is same as that
of Greedy algorithm, we observe that it is significantly faster in
practice. In case of minimization auxiliary objectives, the Stochas-
tic Distorted Greedy algorithm with error parameter ϵ = 0.1 is
Maximization Minimization
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Figure 3: Runtime comparison for auxiliary objectives
more efficient than the deterministic Distorted Greedy algorithm.
Availability of such fast algorithms allows us to use this formula-
tion of fair multi-stakeholder coverage in real-time personalized
recommender systems.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we study the problem of fair multi-stakeholder rec-
ommendations. Our work confirms the idea that formulating multi-
stakeholder coverage objective in form of a submodular function
allows us to leverage existing submodular optimization techniques
that can incorporate commonly used secondary objectives in per-
sonalized recommender systems. Using data from an online real-
estate marketplace, we empirically evaluated the efficiency and
scalability of our proposed approach. Incorporating non-linear
secondary objectives such as learning-to-rank metrics into this
framework remains an open research problem.
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